1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	PROSKAUER ROSE LLP RONALD S. RAUCHBERG (admitted SCOTT P. COOPER (Bar No. 96905) SIMON BLOCK (Bar No. 214999) 2049 Century Park East, 32nd Floor Los Angeles, California 90067 (310) 557-2900 Telephone (310) 557-2193 Facsimile Attorneys for the MGM, Fox, Universal, Viacom, Disney & NBC Copyright Own O'MELVENY AND MYERS LLP ROBERT M. SCHWARTZ (Bar No. 11 1999 Avenue of the Stars, Seventh Floot Los Angeles, California 90067 (310) 553-6700 Telephone (310) 246-6779 Facsimile Attorneys for the Time Warner Copyright MCDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY ROBERT H. ROTSTEIN (Bar No. 0724 2049 Century Park East, 34th Floor Los Angeles, California, 90067 (310) 277-4110 Telephone (310) 277-4730 Facsimile Attorneys for the Columbia Copyright Control of the Columbia Copy	ers 7166) r ht Owners 452)
14 15	[Full counsel appearances on signature p	
16	UNITED STATE	S DISTRICT COURT
17	CENTRAL DISTR	ICT OF CALIFORNIA
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27	PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORPORATION et al., Plaintiffs, v. REPLAYTV, INC. and SONICBLUE, INC., Defendants.	Case No. 01-09358 FMC (Ex) Hon. Florence-Marie Cooper NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION OF THE COPYRIGHT OWNERS TO DISMISS THE NEWMARK PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES AND DECLARATION OF SCOTT P. COOPER IN SUPPORT THEREOF [Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 2201] DATE: January 12, 2004 TIME: 10:00 a.m. PLACE: Courtroom 750
28	}	TEACE. Couldoom 150

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, on Monday, January 12, 2004 at 10:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard by the Honorable Florence-Marie Cooper, United States District Court Judge, in Courtroom 750, located at 255 East Temple Street, Los Angeles, California 90012, the undersigned parties (collectively, the "Copyright Owners") will, and do hereby, move, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, for an order dismissing the Complaint for Copyright Declaratory Relief, dated June 6, 2002 (the "Newmark Plaintiffs' Complaint"), of Craig Newmark, Shawn Hughes, Keith Ogden, Glenn Fleishman and Phil Wright (the "Newmark Plaintiffs").

This Notice of Motion and Motion is, and will be, based on the following grounds:

- (1) Given the dismissal of the underlying lawsuit against Defendants
 SONICblue Incorporated and ReplayTV, Inc. that the Court previously
 held created an "actual controversy" between the Newmark Plaintiffs
 and the Copyright Owners, the Newmark Plaintiffs' Complaint is not
 justiciable as a matter of law under the Declaratory Judgment Act and
 Article III of the United States Constitution because the Newmark
 Plaintiffs cannot establish a reasonable apprehension that they will be
 subjected to liability based on the Copyright Owners' actions; and
- (2) The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Newmark Plaintiffs' Complaint because the Copyright Owners have covenanted not to sue the Newmark Plaintiffs for copyright infringement arising from the Newmark Plaintiffs' uses of their ReplayTV digital video recorders ("DVRs") as alleged in their Complaint, and accordingly there can be no justiciable case and controversy.

This Motion is, and will be, based upon this Notice of Motion and Motion, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Declaration of Scott P. Cooper,

attached hereto, all of the papers, pleadings and records on file in the above-1 captioned proceeding, and such oral argument as may be presented at the hearing on 2 this Motion. 3 This Motion is made following the conference of counsel pursuant to Local 4 Rule 7-3, which took place on July 24, 2003. 5 Dated: October 13, 2003 6 7 Respectfully submitted, 8 9 SIMON BLOCK 10 11 RONALD S. RAUCHBERG ROBERT M. SCHWARTZ 12 SCOTT P. COOPER ALAN RADER SIMON BLOCK **BENJAMIN SHEFFNER** 13 PROSKAUER ROSE LLP O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP 14 Attorneys for Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Attorneys for Time Warner Entertainment 15 Inc., Orion Pictures Corporation, Twentieth Company, L.P., Home Box Office, Warner Bros., Warner Bros. Television, Time Warner Century Fox Film Corporation, Universal City 16 Studios Productions LLLP (formerly Universal Inc., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., New City Studios Productions, Inc.), Fox Line Cinema Corporation, Castle Rock 17 Entertainment, and The WB Television Broadcasting Company, Paramount Pictures Corporation, Disney Enterprises, Inc., National Network Partners L.P. 18 Broadcasting Company, Inc., NBC Studios, 19 Inc., Showtime Networks Inc., UPN (formerly the United Paramount Network), ABC, Inc., 20 Viacom International Inc., CBS Worldwide Inc., and CBS Broadcasting, Inc. 21 22 ROBERT H. ROTSTEIN 23 ALLAN L. SCHARE LISA E. STONE 24 McDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY 25 Attorneys for Columbia Pictures Industries, 26 Inc., Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., Columbia TriStar Television, Inc., and TriStar 27 Television, Inc. 28

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

Article III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to matters of "actual controversy" between parties during the entire pendency of the lawsuit. Thus, a party may not pursue an action for declaratory relief unless an actual controversy exists throughout the litigation – even where a controversy existed when the party filed the complaint. Two recent events have put an end to any actual controversy between the Copyright Owners and the Newmark Plaintiffs, such that the Court has no subject matter jurisdiction over the Newmark Plaintiffs' declaratory relief action against the Copyright Owners and defendants SONICblue Incorporated and ReplayTV, Inc. (collectively, "SONICblue").

First, the Copyright Owners and SONICblue recently stipulated to the dismissal of the ReplayTV Action that precipitated the Newmark Plaintiffs' filing of their complaint. Since the Copyright Owners' allegations in the ReplayTV Action was the only basis on which the Court found an actual controversy between the Copyright Owners and the Newmark Plaintiffs, the Newmark Plaintiffs no longer can meet their burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction over their declaratory relief claims.

Second, to avoid any ambiguity as to the existence of an actual controversy, the Copyright Owners have covenanted not to sue the Newmark Plaintiffs for copyright infringement for their uses of their ReplayTV DVRs. This covenant similarly eliminates the Court's jurisdiction, and the Newmark Plaintiffs' Complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3).

¹ As used herein, the "ReplayTV Action" refers to the four consolidated actions commenced by the Copyright Owners against SONICblue in late 2001, asserting, *inter alia*, copyright infringement claims against SONICblue relating to its new DVR.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND SIGNIFICANT RECENT

DEVELOPMENTS

A. Prior Proceedings

As the Court will recall, the Copyright Owners commenced the ReplayTV Action against SONICblue in late 2001 relating to its about to be released DVR, the ReplayTV 4000 series. Based on SONICblue's conduct, the Copyright Owners asserted claims against SONICblue for, *inter alia*, direct, contributory, and vicarious copyright infringement.

In June 2002, a little over seven months after the commencement of the ReplayTV Action, five individual owners of ReplayTV 4000s, the Newmark Plaintiffs, brought the declaratory relief action against the Copyright Owners and SONICblue, seeking a declaration that their specific uses of their ReplayTV 4000s were lawful (the "Newmark Declaratory Relief Action"). The Copyright Owners moved to dismiss the Newmark Plaintiffs' declaratory relief claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the claims did not present an "actual controversy," as required by the Declaratory Judgment Act and Article III of the United States Constitution. Alternatively, the Copyright Owners moved the Court to exercise its discretionary authority under the Declaratory Judgment Act to dismiss or stay the Newmark Declaratory Relief Action.

In its August 15, 2002 ruling, reported at *Newmark v. Turner Broadcasting Network*, 226 F. Supp.2d 1215 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (the "Order"), the Court denied the Copyright Owners' motion to dismiss or, alternatively, to stay the Newmark Declaratory Relief Action.² In finding the existence of an "actual controversy," the Court held that the Copyright Owners' allegations in the ReplayTV Action were sufficient to raise a reasonable apprehension in the individual Newmark Plaintiffs

² For the Court's convenience, a copy of the Order is attached as Exhibit 1 to the annexed Declaration of Scott P. Cooper, dated October 13, 2003 ("Cooper Decl.").

that they would be subjected to liability for copyright infringement. See Order, at 7-1 2 3 4

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В. **Recent Events**

On March 21, 2003, SONICblue filed voluntary petitions in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California.³ Three days later, this Court issued an order staying all proceedings in this case. See Cooper Decl., Exh. B. On July 24, 2003, during the Local Rule 7-3 conference of counsel, the Copyright Owners covenanted not to sue the Newmark Plaintiffs for copyright infringement arising from the Newmark Plaintiffs' uses of their ReplayTV DVRs as alleged in their Complaint. Id., ¶ 5 and Exh. 3. Despite the covenant, the Newmark Plaintiffs have refused to dismiss their declaratory relief claims against the Copyright Owners voluntarily. Id.

On August 19, 2003, the Bankruptcy Court issued an order modifying the automatic stay provided for in Bankruptcy Code Section 362 to allow (1) the Copyright Owners and SONICblue to stipulate to the voluntary dismissal of the ReplayTV Action in this Court; and (2) the parties to stipulate to the voluntary dismissal of the Newmark Declaratory Relief Action as to SONICblue in this Court. Id., ¶ 6 and Exh. 4.

All of the parties to these consolidated actions recently filed with this Court a stipulation dismissing without prejudice the ReplayTV Action in its entirety, and dismissing the Newmark Declaratory Relief Action as to SONICblue only. See id., ¶ 7 and Exh. 5. Thus, of the five previously consolidated ReplayTV-related actions, the only remaining claims pending before this Court are the Newmark Plaintiffs'

On April 25, 2003, with Bankruptcy Court approval, SONICblue sold its ReplayTV assets to a

Action and the Newmark Declaratory Relief Action. In June 2003, the purchaser of SONICblue's ReplayTV assets announced that its new DVR model, the ReplayTV 5500 series, scheduled to be

available to consumers in August 2003, would not include two of the features formerly at issue in

third party. As a result of the sale, SONICblue no longer is in the business of manufacturing, selling or supporting the ReplayTV DVRs (and accompanying services) at issue in the ReplayTV

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the ReplayTV Action.

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declaratory relief claims against the Copyright Owners that are the subject of this

III. ARGUMENT

A. The Newmark Plaintiffs No Longer Can Satisfy The "Actual Controversy" Requirement For Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

The Declaratory Judgment Act specifically provides that a federal court may grant declaratory relief *only* where there is an "actual controversy." 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). This requirement is jurisdictional. *Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co.*, 312 U.S. 270, 272 (1941) ("the District Court is without power to grant declaratory relief unless ... a[n] ['actual] controversy['] exists."). Thus, as this Court previously noted, "[i]f the Newmark Plaintiffs' claims do not present an actual 'case or controversy,' the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the matter, and the claims must be dismissed." Order, at 4.

For an action for declaratory relief to proceed, it is not enough that an actual controversy existed at the time a declaratory relief complaint is filed. The basis on which jurisdiction exists must continue throughout the suit, or the court is divested of jurisdiction. "To qualify as a case fit for federal-court adjudication, 'an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed." *Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona*, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997) (quoting *Preiser v. Newkirk*, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975)). Therefore, "[i]t is not enough that there may have been a controversy when the action was commenced if subsequent events have put an end to the controversy" 10B Wright, Miller & Kane, *Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 3d*, § 2757, at 495 (1998); *Mailer v. Zolotow*, 380 F. Supp. 894, 896-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (same).

⁴ See also Oregon Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1116 (9th Cir. 2003) (same); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1556 n.22 (9th Cir. 1990) (the "actual controversy" requirement "must be satisfied as of the time that the suit is filed and must continue throughout the term of the suit.").

The declaratory relief plaintiff bears the burden of proving the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. *E.g.*, Order, at 4 ("The burden of proof on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is on the party asserting jurisdiction.") (citing *Sopcak v. Northern Mountain Helicopter Serv.*, 52 F.3d 817, 818 (9th Cir. 1995)); *K-Lath, Div. of Tree Island Wire (USA), Inc. v. Davis Wire Corp.*, 15 F. Supp.2d 952, 958 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (same). The Newmark Plaintiffs no longer can meet their burden of proving an "actual controversy" for two reasons, each of which alone is sufficient to eliminate this Court's subject matter jurisdiction. First, the Copyright Owners' voluntary dismissal of the ReplayTV Action eliminates the only basis on which the Court previously determined the existence of a legally cognizable threat of a claim against the Newmark Plaintiffs. Second, the Copyright Owners' covenant not to sue the Newmark Plaintiffs for copyright infringement in any event divests this Court of subject matter jurisdiction over the Newmark Plaintiffs' claims.

1. The Dismissal Of The ReplayTV Litigation Has Put An End To Any "Actual Controversy" Between The Newmark Plaintiffs And The Copyright Owners.

Under well-settled law, a declaratory relief plaintiff can satisfy the "actual controversy" requirement only by showing that the defendants' actions created in the plaintiff a "reasonable apprehension" of liability. See Order, at 5 ("[C]ourts must focus on whether a declaratory plaintiff has a 'reasonable apprehension' that he or she will be subjected to liability.") (citing Societe de Conditionnement en Aluminium v. Hunter Eng'g Co., 655 F.2d 938, 944 (9th Cir. 1981)). In its August 15, 2002 Order (Exhibit 1 to the Cooper Declaration), the Court concluded that the only basis on which the Newmark Plaintiffs had a "reasonable apprehension" of a possible claim against them was the existence of the Copyright Owners' allegations against SONICblue in the now-dismissed ReplayTV Action. The Court reasoned as follows:

When viewed from the perspective of the Newmark Plaintiffs, the [Copyright Owners]' allegations in the RePlayTV action are sufficient to raise a reasonable apprehension that they will be subject to liability. The Complaints in the RePlayTV action allege that the actions of the Newmark Plaintiffs (and other RePlayTV DVR owners) constitute direct copyright infringement. Of course, the [Copyright Owners] must allege these facts to support their claims of contributory and vicarious copyright infringement against RePlayTV. But the fact remains that the [Copyright Owners] have, with a great deal of specificity, accused the Newmark Plaintiffs (and other RePlayTV DVR owners) of infringing the [Copyright Owners]' copyrights, and have demonstrated the will to protect copyrights through litigation. These facts raise a reasonable apprehension on the part of the Newmark Plaintiffs.

Order, at 7 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Court noted that "a victory by the [Copyright Owners against SONICblue] *in the RePlayTV action* will necessarily require a determination that the activities of the [ReplayTV DVR] owners constitute direct copyright infringement" *Id.* (emphasis added).

SONICblue's bankruptcy, its exit from the DVR business, and the parties' joint stipulation to dismiss the ReplayTV Action, have ended the active controversy that constituted the sole basis for the Court's finding of an indirect threat of potential claims by the Copyright Owners against the Newmark Plaintiffs. Without the Copyright Owners' allegations of infringing activity by ReplayTV DVR owners, the Newmark Plaintiffs can point to no other actions by the Copyright Owners sufficient to instill in the Newmark Plaintiffs a "reasonable apprehension" of liability. As a result, the Newmark Plaintiffs no longer can meet their burden of proving that their declaratory relief claims present an "actual controversy," and their Complaint must be dismissed. See Solaia Tech. LLC v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., No. 01 X 6641, 2002 WL 31017654, at *2 (N.D. III. Sept. 9, 2002) (finding that plaintiff seeking a

It is axiomatic that the "reasonable apprehension" by the declaratory relief plaintiff "must have been caused by the defendant's actions." *Hal Roach Studios*, 896 F.2d at 1556; *Crown Drug Co. v. Revlon, Inc.*, 703 F.2d 240, 243 (7th Cir. 1983) ("a reasonable apprehension alone, if not inspired by defendant's actions, does not give rise to an actual controversy.") (internal citation omitted). As the Court's prior ruling reflected, other than the Copyright Owners' allegations in the ReplayTV Action, no arguable basis for such apprehension ever existed.

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27 28 declaration of non-infringement, invalidity and unenforceability of a patent cannot show "reasonable apprehension" of liability where "no charge of patent infringement now remains pending").

2. The Copyright Owners' Covenant Not To Sue The Newmark
Plaintiffs For Copyright Infringement Also Divests The Court
Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction for a second, independent reason: because the Copyright Owners have unconditionally covenanted not to sue the Newmark Plaintiffs for copyright infringement arising out of their uses of their ReplayTV DVRs as alleged in their Complaint, there cannot be a legally cognizable threat of liability against the Newmark Plaintiffs for copyright infringement. See Cooper Decl., ¶ 5 and Exh. 3.6 As a matter of law, a covenant not to sue for infringement of intellectual property rights legally removes from the declaratory relief plaintiff a reasonable apprehension of liability, thereby depriving the Court of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v. TCI Cablevision of Cal., Inc., 248 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir.) ("statement of nonliability divested the district court of Article III jurisdiction") (cited in Order, at 6, for another point), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 895 (2001); Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (declaratory relief plaintiff "has no cause for concern that it can be held liable for any infringing acts ..." as a result of covenant not to sue), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1093 (1996); The Gillette Co. v. Optiva Corp., No. 99 Civ. 402 (LAP), 2000 WL 307389, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2000) ("A promise not to bring a patent infringement suit is sufficient to remove a reasonable apprehension of suit."); SL Waber, Inc. v.

⁶ The Court is not restricted to the face of the pleadings when considering a motion challenging the substance of jurisdictional allegations, and may review evidence to resolve any factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction. *See* Order, at 4 (citing *McCarthy v. United States*, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1998), *cert. denied*, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989)).

American Power Conversion Corp., 135 F. Supp.2d 521, 525 (D. N.J. 1999) (covenant not to sue "eliminates any concern [declaratory judgment plaintiff] could have about the threat of [suit]"); Biogen, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 35, 40 (D. Mass. 1996) (dismissing declaratory relief counterclaim based on covenant not to sue); Environmental Dynamics, Inc. v. Robert Tyer and Assocs., 929 F. Supp. 1212, 1248-49 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (same). Under very similar circumstances, a court found that a copyright owner's covenant not to sue removed all reasonable fear of a subsequent suit, precluding the continued assertion of subject matter jurisdiction over the declaratory relief counterclaim. Prudent Publ'g Co. v. Myron Mfg. Corp., 722 F. Supp. 17, 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).

It makes sense that courts regard a covenant not to sue as requiring the dismissal of a declaratory relief claim. As the Federal Circuit has reasoned: "[The covenant not to sue] . . . removes from the field any controversy sufficiently actual to confer jurisdiction over this case. Because [the declaratory relief plaintiff] can have no reasonable apprehension that it will face an infringement suit . . ., it fails to satisfy the first part of our two-part test of justiciability." *Super Sack*, 57 F.3d at 1059.⁷

The case law in this Circuit is entirely consistent with this breadth of authority. While it appears that the Ninth Circuit has not previously had occasion to rule on the precise question of whether a covenant not to sue deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit repeatedly has noted the relevance of a declaratory relief defendant's failure to provide such a promise. *See Hal Roach Studios*, 896 F.2d at 1556 (finding it "relevant, under the circumstances of this case, that [the defendant] has not indicated to [the plaintiff] that it will not institute an

⁷ As the Newmark Plaintiffs previously have observed, "[c]ourts apply the same declaratory relief justiciability standards to patent, trademark and copyright cases." (citing *Hal Roach Studios*, 896 F.2d at 1556). Newmark Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to the Copyright Owners' Motion to Dismiss, dated July 29, 2002, at 5 n.6.

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infringement action."); Chesebrough-Pond's, Inc. v. Faberge, Inc., 666 F.2d 393,
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     397 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that the defendant "did not disclaim an intent to pursue
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     an infringement action"); Societe, 655 F.2d at 945 ("We do think it relevant, in the
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     light of the circumstances, that [the defendant] has not indicated that it will not sue
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     [the plaintiff] for infringement or in any other manner agree to a non-adversary
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     position with respect to the patent.").8
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       As a result of the dismissal of the ReplayTV Action and the Copyright Owners' covenant not to
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     sue the Newmark Plaintiffs as described above, the Court has no subject matter jurisdiction over
     the Newmark Plaintiffs' declaratory relief claims. Consequently, as a matter of law, the Court will
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     not reach the second prong of the traditional analysis under the Declaratory Judgment Act. The
      second prong of the analysis involves the Court's consideration of a variety of factors to determine
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      whether the Court should exercise its discretionary authority to dismiss the action. See Order, at
      1221 ("[T]he Court's exercise of jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act . . . is
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      discretionary."); Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491, 494 (1942). In this case, the
      relevant discretionary factors, which focus on the goal of judicial economy, also favor dismissal of
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      the Newmark Declaratory Relief Action. See Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 288 (1995)
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("In the declaratory judgment context, the normal principle that federal courts should adjudicate

administration."). The extraordinary inefficiencies of proceeding with the declaratory relief action

claims within their jurisdiction yields to considerations of practicality and wise judicial

require dismissal of the Newmark Declaratory Relief Action in any event.

in the absence of any current dispute between the Copyright Owners and SONICblue would

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1	IV. <u>CONCLUSION</u>
2	For the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss the Newmark Plaintiffs'
3	Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) and 28 U.S.C.
4	§ 2201.
5	Dated: October 13, 2003
6	Respectfully submitted,
7	By: Simo Mol SIMON BLOCK
8	SIMON BLOCK
9	
10	RONALD S. RAUCHBERG ROBERT M. SCHWARTZ
11	SCOTT P. COOPER ALAN RADER SIMON BLOCK BENJAMIN SHEFFNER
12	PROSKAUER ROSE LLP O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
13	Attorneys for Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Attorneys for Time Warner Entertainment Company, L.P., Home Box Office, Warner
14	Century Fox Film Corporation, Universal City Bros., Warner Bros. Television, Time Warner
15	Studios Productions LLLP (formerly Universal City Studios Productions, Inc.), Fox Inc., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., New Line Cinema Corporation, Castle Rock
16	Broadcasting Company, Paramount Pictures Entertainment, and The WB Television Corporation, Disney Enterprises, Inc., National Network Partners L.P.
17	Broadcasting Company, Inc., NBC Studios, Inc., Showtime Networks Inc., UPN (formerly
18	the United Paramount Network), ABC, Inc., Viacom International Inc., CBS Worldwide
19	Inc., and CBS Broadcasting, Inc.
20	
21	ROBERT H. ROTSTEIN ALLAN L. SCHARE
22	LISA E. STONE
23	McDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY
24	Attorneys for Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.,
25	Columbia TriStar Television, Inc., and TriStar Television, Inc.
26	1 Cicyision, me.
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I, Scott P. Cooper, declare as follows:

- I am an attorney at law duly admitted to practice before this Court, and I am a member of Proskauer Rose LLP, counsel for Plaintiffs Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., Orion Pictures Corporation, Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, Universal City Studios Productions LLLP (formerly Universal City Studios Productions, Inc.), Fox Broadcasting Company, Paramount Pictures Corporation, Disney Enterprises, Inc., National Broadcasting Company, Inc., NBC Studios, Inc., Showtime Networks Inc., UPN (formerly the United Paramount Network), ABC, Inc., Viacom International Inc., CBS Worldwide Inc., CBS Broadcasting, Inc. in the above-captioned consolidated actions. I submit this declaration in support of the annexed Motion to Dismiss, dated October 13, 2003. I make this declaration of my own personal knowledge except where otherwise stated,
- 2. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of the Court's Order, dated August 15, 2002, denying the Copyright Owners' motion to dismiss or, alternatively, to stay the Newmark Declaratory Relief Action, reported at *Newmark v. Turner Broadcasting Network*, 226 F. Supp.2d 1215 (C.D. Cal. 2002).

and, if called as a witness, I could and would testify competently as set forth below.

- 3. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of the Court's minute order, dated March 24, 2003, staying all proceedings in the above-captioned consolidated actions, following SONICblue's bankruptcy filing.
- 4. On July 7, 2003, I had a telephone conversation with Ira Rothken, one of the counsel for the Newmark Plaintiffs, in which I advised Mr. Rothken of the Copyright Owners' intention to voluntarily dismiss the ReplayTV Action, and requested that the Newmark Plaintiffs agree to voluntarily dismiss the Newmark Declaratory Relief Action. I further advised Mr. Rothken that the Copyright Owners intended to move to dismiss the Newmark Declaratory Relief Action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the event the Newmark Plaintiffs did not agree

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
to voluntarily dismiss the Newmark Declaratory Relief Action. Mr. Rothken informed me that the Newmark Plaintiffs would not agree to dismiss their declaratory relief action against the Copyright Owners and would oppose the Copyright Owners' motion to dismiss.


- 5. Further to my July 7 conversation with Ira Rothken, on July 24, 2003, I had a telephone conversation with Gwen Hinze, one of the other counsel for the Newmark Plaintiffs, pursuant to Local Rule 7-3. During that conversation, I advised Ms. Hinze that the Copyright Owners unconditionally covenant not to sue the Newmark Plaintiffs for copyright infringement arising out of their past or future uses of their ReplayTV digital video recorders as alleged in their declaratory relief complaint. I further advised Ms. Hinze that this covenant, combined with the impending dismissal of the Copyright Owners' claims against SONICblue and the Newmark Plaintiffs' announcement of their intention to voluntarily dismiss the declaratory relief complaint against SONICblue, establish beyond any doubt that the Newmark Plaintiffs' declaratory relief claims are no longer justiciable as a matter of law under the Declaratory Judgment Act and Article III of the United States Constitution. Ms. Hinze informed me that the Newmark Plaintiffs nonetheless intended to oppose the Copyright Owners' motion to dismiss. Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of my letter to Ms. Hinze, dated July 14, 2003, confirming our telephone conversation.
- 6. On August 19, 2003, the Bankruptcy Court issued an order modifying the automatic stay provided for in Bankruptcy Code Section 362 to allow (1) the Copyright Owners and SONICblue to stipulate to the voluntary dismissal of the ReplayTV Action in this Court; and (2) the parties to stipulate to the voluntary dismissal of the Newmark Declaratory Relief Action as to SONICblue in this Court. Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of the Bankruptcy Court's August 19, 2003 order.
 - 7. Attached hereto as Exhibit 5 is a true and correct copy of the

1	Stipulation of Dismissal, executed by all of the parties to these consolidated actions,
2	dismissing all of the consolidated actions as to SONICblue, without prejudice,
3	pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(ii).
4	I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of
5	America that the foregoing is true and correct.
6	Executed this 13th day of October, 2003, in Los Angeles, California.
7	Alfall
8	Scott P. Cooper
9	Jean F. Gooper
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3660/54002-001 LAWORD/28329

EXHIBIT 1





UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CRAIG NEWMARK, et al.,

CV 02-04445 FMC (Ex)

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vs.

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Plaintiffs,

GRANTING

BROADCASTING NETWORK, et al.,

Defendants.

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This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, to Stay Proceedings, and Plaintiffs' Motion to Consolidate.

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These matters were heard on August 12, 2002, at which time the parties were in

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receipt of the Court's tentative order. For the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby denies the Motion to Dismiss (docket #43-1), hereby denies the

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Motion to Stay (docket #43-2), and hereby grants the Motion to Consolidate

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(docket #45).

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I. Background

The parties are well-acquainted with the nature of the present action and Paramount Pictures Corporation v. RePlayTV, Inc., No. 02-04445 FMC (Ex) ("the RePlayTV action"), which are only briefly described below.

The RePlayTV Action

Plaintiffs in the RePlayTV action are a number of television and film companies in the entertainment industry. Defendants in the RePlayTV action are SONICblue, Inc. ("SONICblue"), and its wholly owned subsidiary, RePlayTV, Inc ("RePlayTV").2

The factual allegations in the RePlayTV action center on the development and sale by RePlayTV of a digital video recorder: the RePlayTV 4000 series. The digital video recorder, or DVR, enables television viewers to make digital copies of copyrighted television programs. The DVRs are equipped with commercial-skipping features, and they may be used to send copies of televised programs (or "content") to other RePlayTV owners via high-speed internet connections.

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¹ Specifically, the Plaintiffs in the RePlayTV action are Paramount Pictures Corp. ("Paramount"); Disney Enterprises, Inc. ("Disney"); National Broadcasting Company 19 "NBC"); NBC Studios, Inc. ("NBC Studios"); Showtime Networks, Inc. ("Showtime"); The 20 United Paramount Network ("UPN"); ABC, Inc. ("ABC"); Viacom International, Inc. "Viacom"); CBS Worldwide, Inc. ("CBS Worldwide"); CBS Broadcasting, Inc. ("CBS"); Time Warner Entertainment Company, L.P. ("TWE"); Home Box Office ("HBO"); Warner Brothers 22 ("Warner Brothers"); Warner Brothers Television ("WBT"); Time Warner, Inc. ("TWI"); Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. ("Turner Broadcasting"); New Line Cinema Corp. ("New Line"); Castle Rock Entertainment ("Castle Rock"); The WB Television Network Partners, L.P ("WBT Network"); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. ("MGM"); Orion Pictures Corp. 24 "Orion"); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. ("Fox"); Universal City Studios Productions, 25 Inc. ("Universal"); Fox Broadcasting Co. ("FBC"); Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. ("Columbia Industries"); Columbia Pictures Television ("Columbia Television"); Columbia 26 Tristar Television ("CTTV"); and TriStar Television, Inc. ("TriStar Television").

² Throughout this Order, the Court will refer to SONICblue, Inc., and RePlayTV, Inc., 28 collectively as "RePlayTV."

The Plaintiffs in the RePlayTV action have asserted claims against SONICblue and RePlayTV based on, inter alia, contributory and vicarious copyright infringement. These claims are based on the alleged direct copyright infringement committed by the owners of the RePlayTV DVRs. (See, e.g., Paramount Compl., No. 01-09358, ¶ 64 (regarding contributory infringement); ¶ 71 (regarding vicarious infringement)).

B. The Newmark Action

Five owners of RePlayTV DVRs have filed the present declaratory relief action in this Court.

All the twenty-eight plaintiffs in the RePlayTV action are defendants in the present action, which the Court refers to as the Newmark action. Throughout this Order, the Court refers to these defendants as "the Entertainment Defendants." SONICblue and RePlayTV are defendants in the present action as well.

The factual allegations in the Complaint reveal that the *Newmark* Plaintiffs use the units to record content for later viewing;³ some of the Plaintiffs transfer content to laptop computers for viewing while traveling. Plaintiffs use the commercial-skipping features of the RePlayTV DVRs; at least one Plaintiff uses the commercial-skipping features to control the advertising to which his children are exposed.

The Newmark Plaintiffs seek a declaration as to whether their activities constitute copyright infringement.

³ This use is referred to as "time-shifting."

II. Motion to Dismiss

The Entertainment Defendants move to dismiss the Newmark Plaintiffs' claims, arguing that the claims do not present an actual "case or controversy" as required by the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and Article III of the United States Constitution. If the Newmark Plaintiffs' claims do not present an actual "case or controversy", the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the matter, and the claims must be dismissed. See Mason v. Genisco Technology Corp., 960 F.2d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 1991).

A motion to dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is properly brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The objection presented by this motion is that the court has no authority to hear and decide the case. When considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenging the substance of jurisdictional allegations, the Court is not restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may review any evidence, such as declarations and testimony, to resolve any factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction. See McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052, 109 S. Ct. 1312 (1989). The burden of proof on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is on the party asserting jurisdiction. See Sopcak v. Northern Mountain Helicopter Serv., 52 F.3d 817, 818 (9th Cir. 1995).

The present motion presents a novel issue: Does a plaintiff present an actual "case or controversy" under the Declaratory Judgment Act and Article III where the plaintiff's conduct is alleged, in a separate action against a third party for contributory and/or vicarious copyright infringement, to be direct copyright infringement? The parties have cited no authority that discusses the actual "case or controversy" requirement in the context of this unique factual scenario, and the Court, in its own research, has found none.

Nevertheless, both the Entertainment Defendants and the Newmark Plaintiffs cite a number of cases that are instructive on this issue, from which

the Court concludes that the *Newmark* Plaintiffs have presented an actual "case or controversy."

The Declaratory Judgment Act permits a federal court to "declare the rights and other legal relations" of parties to "a case of actual controversy." 28 U.S.C. § 2201. This "actual controversy" requirement is the same as the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III of the United States Constitution. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-40, 57 S. Ct. 461, 463 (1937). Therefore, the question of justiciability, and therefore of subject matter jurisdiction, is the same under § 2201 as it is under Article III.

The United States Supreme Court has given guidance as to when "an abstract" question becomes a "controversy" under the Declaratory Judgment Act:

The difference between an abstract question and a "controversy" contemplated by the Declaratory Judgment Act is necessarily one of degree, and it would be difficult, if it would be possible, to fashion a precise test for determining in every case whether there is such a controversy. Basically, the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273, 61 S. Ct. 510, 512 (1941).

Applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that something less than an "actual threat" of litigation is required to meet the "case or controversy" requirement; instead, courts must focus on whether a declaratory plaintiff has a "reasonable apprehension" that he or she will be subjected to liability. Societe de Conditionnement en Aluminum v. Hunter Engineering Co., Inc., 655 F.2d 938,

944 (9th Cir. 1981). In Societe, the court first noted that the parties' assumption that a declaratory plaintiff must be subject to an "actual threat" was incorrect:

We infer from the arguments of the parties that they agree that an actual threat of litigation must be made by the [declaratory defendant] for a case or controversy to exist. We assume that the district court applied this standard in reaching its decision. We conclude that the Constitution has a much lower threshold than this standard would suggest.

Id. The Ninth Circuit then went on to hold that the determination of whether a case or controversy exists must focus on the reasonable apprehension of the declaratory plaintiff:

A better way to conceptualize the case or controversy standard is to focus on the declaratory judgment plaintiff. An action for a declaratory judgment that a patent is invalid, or that the plaintiff is not infringing, is a case or controversy if the plaintiff has a real and reasonable apprehension that he will be subject to liability if he continues to manufacture his product.

Id.

Other cases make it clear that no explicit threat of litigation is required to meet the "case or controversy" requirement. See also K-Lath v. Davis Wire Corp., 15 F. Supp. 2d 952 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (noting that a plaintiff seeking declaratory judgment must show "an explicit threat or other action" that creates a reasonable apprehension that the plaintiff will face an infringement suit) (emphasis added); Intellectual Property Development v. TCI Cablevision of California, Inc., 248 F.3d 1333, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("other action" is sufficient), cert. denied, __U.S. __, 122 S. Ct. 216 (2001); Guthy-Renker Fitness v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 179 F.R.D. 264 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (same).

The Entertainment Defendants argue that the Newmark Plaintiffs cannot

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have a reasonable apprehension that they will face liability based on their use of their RePlayTV DVRs. The Entertainment Defendants contend that did not even know about the *Newmark* Plaintiffs until they filed this action, and that they did not name any individual Doe defendants in the *RePlayTV* action and point out that they make these allegations only because these allegations are necessary to state a claim against RePlayTV for contributory and vicarious copyright infringement.

However, the *Newmark* Plaintiffs argue persuasively that a victory by the Entertainment Defendants in the *RePlayTV* action will necessarily require a determination that the activities of the owners constitute direct copyright infringement, thereby instilling in them a reasonable apprehension that they will be subject to liability.

When viewed from the perspective of the Newmark Plaintiffs, the Entertainment Defendants' allegations in the RePlayTV action are sufficient to raise a reasonable apprehension that they will be subject to liability. The Complaints in the RePlayTV action allege that the actions of the Newmark Plaintiffs (and other RePlayTV DVR owners) constitute direct copyright infringement. Of course, the Entertainment Defendants must allege these facts to support their claims of contributory and vicarious copyright infringement against RePlayTV. But the fact remains that the Entertainment Defendants have, with a great deal of specificity, accused the Newmark Plaintiffs (and other RePlayTV DVR owners) of infringing the Entertainment Defendants' copyrights, and have demonstrated the will to protect copyrights through litigation. These facts raise a reasonable apprehension on the part of the Newmark Plaintiffs. This is especially so because that it appears from the Complaint in the Newmark action that the Newmark Plaintiffs are continuing to use their RePlayTV DVRs in a manner that the Entertainment Defendants allege constitutes infringing activity.

The Entertainment Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate any direct communication with defendants. However, it is clear in the Ninth Circuit that such direct communication is not necessarily required. See Societe de Conditionnement en Aluminum, 655 F.2d at 944-45. (finding that communication to third party could reasonably be viewed as a threat of litigation).

For these reasons, the Court holds that the claims of the *Newmark* Plaintiffs present an actual case or controversy, and that therefore this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Accordingly, the Court hereby denies Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

III. Motion to Stay Action

In the alternative, the Entertainment Defendants move the Court to exercise its discretionary authority under the Declaratory Judgment Act to dismiss or stay this action.

The Court's exercise of jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, is discretionary:

In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, ... any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.

Id. (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court has interpreted this language as conferring the discretion, but not the obligation, to render declaratory judgments: "This is an enabling Act, which confers a discretion on the courts rather than an absolute right upon the litigant." See Public Service Commission of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 241, 73 S. Ct. 236 (1952). "The Declaratory Judgment Act was an authorization, not a command. It gave the

federal courts competence to make a declaration of rights; it did not impose a duty to do so." *Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover*, 369 U.S. 111, 112, 82 S. Ct. 580 (1962). "A declaratory judgment, like other forms of equitable relief, should be granted only as a matter of judicial discretion, exercised in the public interest." *Id.*

The Supreme Court not surprisingly has noted, however, that the refusal to exercise its discretion must be principled and reasonable, and should be articulated: "Of course a District Court cannot decline to entertain such an action as a matter of whim or personal disinclination." *Id*.

This Court considers a number of factors in determining whether a stay should be granted. The factors enunciated in *Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Company of America*, 316 U.S. 491, 62 S. Ct. 1173 (1942), are meaningful when the underlying action is a state action, rather than where, as here, the underlying action is proceeding in the same forum. *Brillhart* requires federal courts to 1) avoid needless determinations of state law issues, 2) discourage forum shopping, and 2) avoid duplicative litigation. These factors are not particularly helpful to the Court's analysis in this case. *Id*.

The Ninth Circuit has noted, however, that the Brillhart factors are not exhaustive. See Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1225 n.5 (9th Cir. 1998). Other factors to be considered by the Court are 1) whether the declaratory action will settle all aspects of the controversy; 2) whether the declaratory action will serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations at issue; 3) whether the declaratory action is being sought merely for the purposes of procedural fencing or to obtain a "res judicata" advantage; and 4) whether the use of a declaratory action will result in entanglements between the federal and state court systems. Id.

The fourth factor, like the Brillhart factors, is inapplicable here.

The first and second factor appear to the Court to be interrelated, and to

28 Id.

weigh in favor of denying a stay. The argument in favor of a stay is that all the issues presented in the *Newmark* action will necessarily be resolved by the *RePlayTV* action. However, the Court is persuaded that the *Newmark* Plaintiffs may be correct that the *RePlayTV* action will not necessarily resolve what specific uses, if any,⁴ of the RePlayTV DVR constitute fair use.⁵ Denying the stay furthers the purpose of the first and second factors — to resolve the uncertainties in the relations between the parties. The rationale behind these factors are better served by permitting the *RePlayTV* action and the *Newmark* action to proceed simultaneously.

Despite the Entertainment Defendants' argument, the Court is unconvinced that the Newmark action constitutes "procedural fencing." The Entertainment Defendants contend that the Newmark Plaintiffs' true intent is to circumvent the intervention requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 and to, in effect, intervene in the RePlayTV action. The Court is persuaded, however, that the Newmark Plaintiffs could well meet the intervention requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). The Newmark Plaintiffs claim an interest in the transaction at issue, and are so situated that the resolution of the RePlayTV action may as

⁴ The RePlayTV action is in its early stages. At this time, the Court expresses no opinion as to the merits of the claims advanced in the RePlayTV action.

⁵ The Court recognizes that resolution of the RePlayTV action may significantly narrow the issues presented in the Newmark action.

⁶ Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action:...
(2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.

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a practical matter impair or impede their ability to protect that interest.⁷ The Court is persuaded that although RePlayTV's interests and the interests of the Newmark Plaintiffs overlap significantly, those interests are not perfectly The Newmark Plaintiffs' interests are focused on whether specific uses constitute "fair use" under copyright law; RePlayTV's interests (and legal defenses) are likely to venture beyond the fair use doctrine. Therefore, the Court rejects the Entertainment Defendants' argument that the Newmark Plaintiffs' true intent is to circumvent the intervention requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24, and that their actions constitute mere "procedural fencing".

The Court concludes that the factors set forth in Dizol favor a denial of a stay.

The Court has also considered whether a stay will serve the public interest. See Rickover, 369 U.S. at 112. The Court recognizes that any unnecessary delay in adjudicating the rights of the Newmark Plaintiffs may chill their use of their RePlayTV DVRs. Similarly, any unnecessary delay may also lead to increased liability for statutory damages under federal copyright law. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (authorizing statutory damages for each non-willful violation of no less than \$750 and no more than \$30,000). Additionally, the Court is persuaded that denying the stay may result in a more fully developed factual record regarding the consumers' uses of the RePlayTV DVR and, as a result, the Court may be better able to fashion an appropriate equitable relief. The Court agrees that the public interest would not be served by the granting of a stay.

Accordingly, the Court hereby denies the Motion to Stay.

⁷ For instance, the Newmark Plaintiffs' ability to protect their interest in using their RePlayTV DVRs would be impaired if the Court were to order that RePlayTV disable the 28 send-show and commercial skipping features of the DVRs.

IV. Motion to Consolidate

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize consolidation of cases in appropriate circumstances:

When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a).

Under this standard, it is clear to the Court that the Newmark action should be consolidated with the RePlayTV action. The actions involve common questions of law and fact. Both actions involve a determination of whether the use of certain features of the RePlayTV DVR constitutes copyright infringement. Both cases are at the early stage of litigation, which facilitates consolidation, at least for discovery and pretrial purposes.⁸

The Entertainment Defendants argue that the actions should not be consolidated. They correctly contend that the issues presented in the Newmark action — whether the specific uses of the Newmark Plaintiffs constitute fair use — is narrower than the issues presented in the RePlayTV action. From this fact, the Entertainment Defendants conclude that the Newmark action will be more quickly and efficiently resolved if it is not consolidated with the RePlayTV action. Nevertheless, there is no question that the issue of whether the Newmark Plaintiffs' use of the RePlayTV DVRs' send-show and commercial-skipping features constitutes fair use will most likely figure prominently in both the RePlayTV action and the Newmark action. The Court

⁸ The Court reserves for another day the issue of whether these actions should be consolidated for trial.

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is unconvinced that the Entertainment Defendants' are correct in characterizing the Newmark action as a case that will require little discovery and that will be resolved quickly if not consolidated. The issue of fair use has yielded a great deal of discovery in the RePlayTV action, and promises to do the same in this action.9

The Entertainment Defendants also claim that the Newmark Plaintiffs, in seeking consolidation, are merely attempting to gain unfettered access to discovery documents, and to widen the scope of discovery in RePlayTV action. That a party may seek discovery of irrelevant documents is a danger in any litigation; this concern is not unique to consolidated cases. procedural protections in place that assist parties in guarding against a party obtaining that irrelevant discovery. The Entertainment Defendants are well versed in seeking such protection. The Court does not at this time resolve issues regarding the scope of discovery; rather, the Court merely notes that the Entertainment Defendants' concerns regarding access to discovery do not persuade the Court that consolidation is inappropriate.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court is guided by the agreement of the Newmark Plaintiffs' counsel to abide by the terms of the multi-tiered protective order to which the parties stipulated in the RePlayTV action.

⁹ Part of the Entertainment Defendants' Opposition to the Motion for Consolidation addresses the scope of discovery to which the Newmark Plaintiffs would be entitled. They 22 |contend that consolidation will unnecessarily complicate the RePlayTV action because the Newmark Plaintiffs will not be entitled to as broad a range of discovery as RePlayTV was found to be entitled to. The Entertainment Defendants similarly argue that the depositions of the 24 Entertainment Defendant representatives would be unnecessarily complicated as RePlayTV would attempt to question these representatives using documents obtained in discovery in the 25 RePlayTV action. This would cause the Entertainment Defendants to halt the depositions every few moments to discuss whether the Newmark Plaintiffs should be entitled to access to discovery provided in the RePlayTV action.

The Court leaves the determination of the precise scope of discovery to the Magistrate Judge. At this stage of the proceeding, the Court is satisfied that the issue of fair use is present in both actions, and therefore finds the Entertainment Defendant's arguments unpersuasive.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby denies the Motion to Dismiss (docket #43-1), hereby denies the Motion to Stay (docket #43-2), and hereby grants the Motion to Consolidate (docket #45). For ease of recordkeeping, the Court orders that all further documents be filed under Case No. CV 01-09358, and that Case No. CV 02-04445 be closed.

Dated: August 15, 2002

FLORENCE-MARIE COOPER, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EXHIBIT 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA WESTERN DIVISION

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. CV 01-9358 FMC(Ex)

Date: March 24, 2003

Title:

PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORP., et al.

v REPLAYTV, INC., et al

PRESENT:

THE HONORABLE FLORENCE-MARIE COOPER, JUDGE

Alicia Mamer Courtroom Clerk

Not present Court Reporter

ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFS:

ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTS:


Not present

CIVIL - GEN

Not present

PROCEEDINGS: ORDER STAYING CASE DUE TO BANKRUPTCY FILING (In Chambers)

The Court is in receipt of Notice of Filing of Petitions in Bankruptcy Court, filed on March 21, 2003. The Court hereby STAYS all proceedings in this case and orders counsel for plaintiff to file a status report with the Court every 6 months until a request or motion to lift stay is filed.



MINUTES FORM 11

Initials of Deputy Clerk

EXHIBIT 2 PAGE 31

EXHIBIT 3

PROSKAUER ROSE LLP

2049 Century Park East Suite 3200 Los Angeles, CA 90067-3206 Telephone 310.557.2900 Fax 310.557.2193

NEW YORK WASHINGTON BOCA RATON NEWARK PARIS

Scott P. Cooper Member of the Firm

Direct Dial 310.284.5669 scooper@proskauer.com

July 24, 2003

VIA FACSIMILE AND E-MAIL

Gwen Hinze, Esq. Electronic Frontier Foundation 454 Shotwell Street San Francisco, CA 94110

Re: Paramount Pictures Corporation, et al. v. ReplayTV, Inc., et al.

U.S. District Court (C.D. Ca.) Case No. CV 01-09358 FMC (Ex) and Related Cases

Dear Gwen:

This confirms our telephone conversation today. My call and this letter are on behalf of all of the Copyright Owners in the above-referenced actions and are further to my discussion on the same subject with your co-counsel, Ira Rothken, on July 7, 2003. These communications are pursuant to Local Rule 7-3 and for the purpose of conveying the substance of the Copyright Owners' contemplated motion to dismiss the Complaint for Copyright Declaratory Relief, dated June 6, 2002, of your clients (the "Newmark Plaintiffs"), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h) and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (the "Motion"), and related issues.

I discussed in detail with Ira on July 7 the legal basis for our Motion. He informed me that the Newmark Plaintiffs would not agree to dismiss their declaratory relief action against the Copyright Owners and would oppose the Motion. Since then, as you know, the Copyright Owners and defendants SONICblue Incorporated and ReplayTV, Inc. (collectively, "SONICblue") have agreed to stipulate to obtain Bankruptcy Court approval for a modification of the automatic stay contained in Bankruptcy Code Section 362 to allow the Copyright Owners and SONICblue to file in the District Court their stipulation of dismissal without prejudice of the Copyright Owners' claims against SONICblue. The Copyright Owners also intend to file with the District Court their application for the District Court to lift its stay of this action for the purposes of allowing them to file their stipulation of dismissal and the Motion.

PROSKAUER ROSE LLP

Gwen Hinze, Esq. July 24, 2003 Page 2

This also confirms that the Copyright Owners unconditionally covenant not to sue the Newmark Plaintiffs for copyright infringement arising out of their past or future uses of their ReplayTV digital video recorders as alleged in their declaratory relief complaint. We believe that this covenant, combined with the impending dismissal of the Copyright Owners' claims against SONICblue and the Newmark Plaintiffs' announcement of their intention to voluntarily dismiss the declaratory relief complaint against SONICblue, establish beyond any doubt that your clients' declaratory relief claims are no longer justiciable as a matter of law under the Declaratory Judgment Act and Article III of the United States Constitution. You informed me that your clients nonetheless intend to oppose the Motion. Accordingly, we will proceed with the Motion.

Very truly yours,

Scott P. Cooper

cc: Emmett C. Stanton, Esq. Laurence F. Pulgram, Esq.

Ira P. Rothken, Esq.

Copyright Owners' Counsel

EXHIBIT 4

FILED 1 PILLSBURY WINTHROP LLP CRAIG A. BARBAROSH #160224 AUG 1 4 2003 2 SUE J. HODGES #137808 MARK D. HOULE #194861 United States Easkruptcy Court 3 650 Town Center Drive, 7th Floor San coos, Culifornia Costa Mesa, CA 92626-7122 Telephone: (714) 436-6800 4 Facsimile: (714) 436-2800 5 AUG 2 5 2003 6 Attorneys for Debtors and Debtors-In-Possession 7 8 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 SAN JOSE DIVISION 11 IN RE: Case Nos. 03-51775, 03-51776, 03-51777 and 03-51778 MM 12 SONICBLUE INCORPORATED, a Delaware corporation, DIAMOND CHAPTER 11 Cases, Jointly Administered MULTIMEDIA SYSTEMS, INC., a 13 Delaware corporation, REPLAYTV, INC., a STIPULATION FOR RELIEF FROM THE 14 Delaware corporation, and SENSORY AUTOMATIC STAY TO ALLOW SCIENCE CORPORATION, a Delaware DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN COPYRIGHT 15 corporation, LITIGATION; AND ORDER THEREON. 16 [No Hearing Required] 17 Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession 18 19 20 This Stipulation For Relief From The Automatic Stay ("Stipulation") is entered into by and between SONICblue Incorporated and ReplayTV, Inc., two of the debtors and 21 debtors-in-possession in the above captioned cases (collectively, "Debtors"), the Official 22 Committee of Unsecured Creditors ("Committee"), Time Warner Entertainment Company, 23 L.P., Home Box Office, Warner Bros., Warner Bros. Television, Time Warner Inc., Turner 24 Broadcasting System, Inc., New Line Cinema Corporation, Castle Rock Entertainment, The 25 26 WB Television Network Partners L.P., Paramount Pictures Corporation, Disney 27 Enterprises, Inc., National Broadcasting Company, Inc., NBC Studios, Inc., Showtime 28

EXHIBIT 4
PAGE 34

STIPULATION FOR RELIEF FROM STAY

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Networks Inc., UPN (formerly, The United Paramount Network), ABC, Inc., Viacom International Inc., CBS Worldwide Inc., CBS Broadcasting, Inc., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., Orion Pictures Corporation, Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, Universal City Studios Productions LLLP (formerly, Universal City Studios Productions, Inc.), Fox Broadcasting Company, Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., Columbia TriStar Television, Inc., and TriStar Television, Inc. (collectively, the "Copyright Plaintiffs"), plaintiffs in the Copyright Litigation, as defined herein, and Craig Newmark, Shawn Hughes, Keith Ogden, Glenn Fleishman and Phil Wright (collectively, the "Newmark Plaintiffs"), plaintiffs in the Newmark Action, as defined herein, by and through their respective undersigned counsel. This Stipulation is made with respect to the following facts:

I.

RECITALS

A. On March 21, 2003 (the "Petition Date"), the Debtors commenced their Chapter 11 cases by filing voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code"). Following the Petition Date, the Debtors have been operating their businesses and managing their affairs as debtors-in-possession pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Sections 1107(a) and 1108.

The Copyright Litigation

- B. The Copyright Plaintiffs commenced litigation against the Debtors in late 2001, which litigation is now consolidated in the litigation entitled <u>Paramount Pictures</u>

 <u>Corporation</u>, et al. v. ReplayTV, Inc., et al., Case No. CV 01-09358 FMC (Ex), in the United States District Court for the Central District of California (the "Copyright Litigation"). In the Copyright Litigation, Debtor ReplayTV, Inc., asserted a counterclaim against Copyright Plaintiffs Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., and Time Warner, Inc.
- C. In the Copyright Litigation, the Copyright Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to certain digital video recorder products formerly marketed

and sold by the Debtors as part of the Debtors' ReplayTV product line ("ReplayTV Product Line").

- D. The Newmark Plaintiffs, five individual owners of the ReplyTV 4000, one of the products within the ReplayTV Product Line, commenced a declaratory relief action against the Copyright Plaintiffs and the Debtors in June 2002 entitled Newmark, et al. v. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., et al., Former Case No. CV-02-04445 FMC (Ex), in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, which declaratory relief action is now consolidated with the Copyright Litigation for pretrial purposes (the "Newmark Action").
- E. On April 25, 2003, the Bankruptcy Court entered its Orders approving the sale of the ReplayTV Product Line to Digital Networks North America, Inc. The sale of the ReplayTV Product Line closed on April 25, 2003.
- F. The parties submit that relief from stay to allow the Copyright Plaintiffs to dismiss the Copyright Litigation as to the Debtors without prejudice, to allow Debtor ReplayTV, Inc., to dismiss its counterclaim against Copyright Plaintiffs Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., and Time Warner, Inc., in the Copyright Litigation without prejudice, and to allow the Newmark Plaintiffs to dismiss the Newmark Action as to the Debtors without prejudice, is warranted in light of the sale of the ReplayTV Product Line and the cessation of the business operations of the Debtors giving rise to the Copyright Litigation.

II.

STIPULATION

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED, subject to Bankruptcy Court approval, by and between the parties to this Stipulation, through their undersigned counsel, that:

1. Relief From Automatic Stay. The automatic stay contained in Bankruptcy Code Section 362 shall be modified upon entry of the Order approving this Stipulation, to allow (1) the claims asserted by the Copyright Plaintiffs against the Debtors in the

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STIPULATION FOR RELIEF FROM STAY

Copyright Litigation to be dismissed without prejudice, (2) the counterclaim asserted by Debtor ReplayTV, Inc., against Copyright Plaintiffs Turner Broadcasting System. Inc., and Time Warner, Inc., in the Copyright Litigation to be dismissed without prejudice, and (3) the claims asserted by the Newmark Plaintiffs against the Debtors in the Newmark Action to be dismissed without prejudice.

- 2. Exclusive Jurisdiction. The Bankruptcy Court shall retain exclusive jurisdiction to resolve any disputes between the parties hereto regarding the interpretation of this Stipulation, and to enforce the rights and duties specified hereunder.
- Successors and/or Assigns. The provisions of this Stipulation and the order approving it shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto, and their respective successors and assigns.
- 4. Method of Execution. This Stipulation may be executed in original or by facsimile signature and in counterpart copies, and this Stipulation shall be deemed fully executed and effective when all parties have executed and possess a counterpart, even if no single counterpart contains all signatures.

WHEREFORE, the parties hereto request that this Court issue an Order approving this Stipulation.

IT IS SO STIPULATED

DATED: August 6, 2003

PILLSBURY WINTHROP LLP

Craig A. Barbarosh, Esq.

Sue J. Hodges, Esq. Mark D. Houle, Esq.

Attorneys for SONICblue Incorporated and

ReplayTV, Inc.

[Signatures continued on next page]

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EXHIBIT 4 PAGE 38

STIPULATION FOR RELIEF FROM STAY

	R	
;	DATED: August, 2003	LEVENE, NEALE, BENDER, RANKIN & BRILL L.L.P.
3		
3		Ву:
5	·	Ron Bender, Esq. Craig Rankin, Esq. Daniel Reiss, Esq.
6		Attorneys for Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
7	DATED August 7, 2003	O'MELVENY & MEYERS, LLP
8	1	Palus 111 Chil
9 10		Robert M. Schwartz
11		Attorneys for Time Warner Entertainment Company, L.P., Home Box Office, Warner
12		Bros., Warner Bros. Television, Time Warner Inc., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., New
13		Line Cinema Corporation, Castle Rock Entertainment, and The WB Television Network Partners L.P.
14		Tighter t maid Dif .
15	DATED: August, 2003	PROSKAUER ROSE LLP
16		
17		By:
18		Scott P. Cooper, Esq. Martin S. Zohn, Esq.
19		Attorneys for Paramount Pictures Corporation, Disney Enterprises, Inc., National
20		Broadcasting Company, Inc., NBC Studios, Inc., Showtime Networks Inc., UPN (formerly,
21		The United Paramount Network), ABC, Inc., Viacom International Inc., CBS Worldwide
22		Inc., CBS Broadcasting, Inc., Metro-Goldwyn- Mayer Studios Inc., Orion Pictures
23	•	Corporation, Twentleth Century Fox Film Corporation, Universal City Studios
24		Productions LLLP (formerly, Universal City Studios Productions, Inc.), and Fox
25		Broadcasting Company
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28	[Signatures continued on next page]	•
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1	DATED: August 2003	LEVENE, NEALE, BENDER, RANKIN & BRILL L.L.P.
2		
3		Ву:
4 5	·	Ron Bender, Esq. Craig Rankin, Esq. Daniel Reiss, Esq.
6		Attorneys for Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
7	DATED August, 2003	O'MELVENY & MEYERS, LLP
8		
9		By:Robert M. Schwartz
10		
11		Attorneys for Time Warner Entertainment Company, L.P., Home Box Office, Warner
12	?	Bros., Warner Bros. Television, Time Warner Inc., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., New
13		Line Cinema Corporation, Castle Rock Entertainment, and The WB Television Network Partners L.P.
14		
15 16	DATED: August, 2003	PROSKAUER POSE LLP
17		By: Scort P. Cooper, Esq.
18		Martin S. Zohn, Esq. Attorneys for Paramount Pictures Corporation,
19 20		Disney Enterprises, Inc., National Broadcasting Company, Inc., NBC Studios.
21		Inc., Showtime Networks Inc., UPN (formerly, The United Paramount Network), ABC, Inc., Viacom International Inc., CBS Worldwide
22		Inc., CBS Broadcasting, Inc., Metro-Goldwyn- Mayer Studios Inc., Orion Pictures
23		Corporation, Twentieth Century Fox Film
24	•	Corporation, Universal City Studios Productions LLLP (formerly, Universal City
25		Studios Productions, Inc.), and Fox Broadcasting Company
26		
20 27		
28	[Signatures continued on next page]	
	•	
	40145598y2	5 STIPULATION FOR RELIEF FROM STAY

MCDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY DATED: August_ 2003 1 2 By: 3 Robert H. Rotstein, Esq. Roger M. Landau, Esq. 4 Attorneys for Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 5 Columbia TriStar Television, Inc., and TriStar Television, Inc. б 7 **ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION** DATED: August 7, 2003 8 9 Cindy A. Cohn, Esq. Fred von Lohmann, Esq. 10 Gwenith A. Hinze, Esq. Attorneys for Craig Newmark, Shawn Hughes, 11 Keith Ogden, Glenn Fleishman and Phil 12 Wright 13 14 ORDER 15 THE ABOVE STIPULATION IS APPROVED AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 16 day of August, 2003. 17 18 19 THE HONORABLE MARILYN MORGAN 20 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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	06-07-03	11:34am From-McDERMOTT ANTILLEMERY	T-895 P 07/07 F-311
	1	DATED: August 7, 2003	MCDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY
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	. 3		By. Willed A. Tolle
	4		Robert H. Rotstein, Esq. Roger M. Landau, Esq.
	5		Auomeys for Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.,
	6		Columbia TriStar Television, Inc., and TriStar Television, Inc.
	7		
	8	DATED: August 2003	ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION
	9		D
	10		By:Cindy A. Cohn, Esq.
•	11		Fred von Lohmann, Esq. Gwenith A. Hinze, Esq. Anomeys for Craig Newmark, Shawn Hughes, Keith Ogden, Glenn Fleishman and Phil
	12	·	Keith Ogden, Glenn Fleishman and Phil Wright
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	14	·	
	15	THE ABOVE STIDIT ATTOM	ORDER
	16 17	day of August, 2003.	IS APPROVED AND IT IS SO ORDERED this
	18	asy of August, 2003.	
	19	EN	MARILYN MORGAN
	20	FILED	THE HONORABLE MARILYN MORGAN UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
	21	AUG 1 9 2003	
	22	CLERK United States Bankruptcy Court	
	23	United States Bankruptcy Court San Jose, California	
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